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Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Cross-Border Arrest Warrants: 
R. v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, ex p. Bennett 
If the execution of an English warrant for the arrest of a New Zealand citizen 
was deemed to be an abuse of process by the English courts in view of the 
disregard of extradition procedures, is it permissible for the English and 
Scottish police to execute a Scottish warrant, upheld by the High Court of 
Justiciary. for the arrest of the same individual in England? And. moreover, 
does an English court possess the requisite jurisdiction to interfere in the 
execution of Scottish criminal procedure in England? 
These issues were addressed in the case of R . \' . Commissioner of Police of 
the Metropolis, ex p. Bennett [1995] 3 All E.R. 248, which featured the 
redoubtable Paul Bennett, an individual well known to criminal procedure 
lawyers south of the border due to his attempts to review his committal in 
England in the Divisional Court (Bennett v. Horseferry Road /vlagistrates' 
Court [1993] 2 All ER 474) and in the House of Lords (Bennerr \'. Horseferry 
Road A1agislrales' COllrt [1994] 1 A.C. 42: [1993] 3 W.L.R. 90: [1993] 3 All 
E.R. 138). Bennett was alleged to have committed fraud in Scotland and 
various deception offences in England. On November 20. 1989 a warrant for 
his arrest was issued in Scotland for the fraud offences which had taken place 
earlier ·that year in Aberdeenshire. In January 1991. Bennett was seized in 
South Africa. where he was residing, and taken to England to stand trial for 
the offences committed there. Bennett challenged these proceedings by 
judicial review, fir tly to the Di vi ional Court and then to the House of Lord . 
arguing that the proceeding con tituted an abuse of process fo llowing the 
illegal seizure and the deliberate attempt to bypass normal extradition 
procedures. The Hou e of Lord (Lord Oliver dissenting) held that the High 
Court could tay the prosecution and order the defendant's release if there had 
been an abu e of proce s: to a ' certain whether or not such an abuse of proce s 
took place, the High Court had the power to look into the circumstances tn 
which the accused had been brought into the jurisdiction . The case was 
remitted back to the Divi ional Court for further consideration and it was 
decided that. due to the attempt to get around the extradition process and the 
collusion between the South African and the English authorities, the 
committal to the rown Court be quashed and the applicant be discharged 
from bail. 
Bennett al ought to challenge the Scottish warrant on the same basis. 
The High Court of Ju ticiary in Scotland, however, took a different view from 
their Engli h counterparts (Bennett 1'. H.M. Advocate, 1995 S.L.T. 510). On 
October 18, 1994 the Lord Justice General rejected the argu~ent" that there 
had been c llu ion between the South African and the English :authorities and 
held accordingly that it would not be an abuse of the proce~s ~of the SC9ttish 
J 
'-
- -~ . 
..... . . courts to enforce the warrant. The resultant position was that Bennett was in 
England, the English courts had held that it would be an abuse of process to 
enforce the English warrant, yet the Scottish courts had held that the warrant 
issued in Scotland was lawful. Could the Scottish warrant be enforced in 
England? Bennett applied once again to the Divisional Court in England 
seeking an injunct-ion to stop both the Scottish police and the English police 
from executing the Scottish warrant south of the border, primarily on the basis 
that by seeking to execute the Scottish warrant, the English court would be 
committing a further abuse of process as the proceedings in Scotland would 
be tainted with the same illegality . It is important to note that the relief sought 
by Bennett was not the .staying or setting aside of the Scottish warrant or the 
prevention of its execution in Scotland; he accepted that the warrant was 
validly issued by a competent sheriff court in 1989. What was challenged was 
the execution of this warrant in England. 
Before looking at the arguments in the case. it is necessary to examine the 
statutory provisions relating to the execution of Scottish warrants in England 
and Wales. Section 15 of the Indictable Offences Act 1848 allowed for the 
indorsement of a warrant issued in Scotland by an English justice of the peace 
after which it could be executed outh of the border by a Scottish police 
officer. The procedure was simplified by section 38 of the Criminal Law Act 
1977 which provided that a Scottish warrant could be executed by any 
constable in England and Wales. Furthermore. ection 38(4) of the Act 
removed the requirement that a Sconish warrant had to be indorsed by an 
English justice of the peace. 
In eeking the injunction the applicant contended that. although under 
article XIX of the Act of Union 1706 . 'no causes in Scotland be cogno cible 
by the courts of Chancery QUeen's Bench Common Pleas or any other court in 
\Vestminster Hall" (it wa accepted that the Divisional Co un was within the 
category of couns referred to) and (he English courts had "no power to 
cogno ce review or alter the acts or sentences of the judicatures within 
Scotland or stop the execution of the same". the words" top the execution of 
the same" should be construed as meaning the execution of a warrant within 
Scotland only . Therefore. whilst it would not be an abuse of the process of the 
Scottish court to enforce the warrant within Scotland in the present case. it 
would be an abuse of the English court to enforce the same warrant in 
England. In addition. it was submitted on Bennett's behalf that. having regard 
to section l8(1) of the Extradition Act 1989. it would be inappropriate that the 
applicant should be in a worse position, not having been lawfully extradited, 
than he would have been had the proper procedures been followed. If he had 
been extradited solely for the English offences. he could not then have been 
tried in Scotland for the Scottish offences, 
Rose L.l . held (with Potts 1. concurring) that the words "st9P the execution 
of the same" in article XIX of the 1706 Act were not to be read in such a 
limited sense. If the Act had been intended to be confined to ex"ecution in 
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Scotland, it would have stated so categorically. The fact that it did not. made 
it clear that it was not open to an English court to intervene or impede the 
execution of Scottish process. Moreover. the submission on extradition was 
similarly dismissed on the ground that had the applicant been lawfully 
extradited for trial in the United Kingdom. he would without doubt have been 
extradited not only for the offences committed in England but also for those 
committed in Scotland. 
It is apparent from this ruling that although an Engli h court has the power 
to inquire into the circumstances under which a person has been brought into 
its jurisdiction (Bennert \'. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court [1994] I A.C. 
42: [1993] 3 W.L.R. 90: [1993] 3 All E.R. 138), it does not have the power to 
interfere or trespass in the execution of Scottish proce s whether in Scotland 
or in England. It follows that the arrest of an individual pursuant to a Scottish 
warrant cannot amount to an abuse of the process of an English court. which 
has juri diction only over abuses of its own trial proce s. Therefore. in respect 
of the pre ent case. it is only the Scotti h proces which could have been 
tainted or degraded as a result of the improper extradition procedure 
employed. However. on (hi point. the High Court of Justiciary had already 
ruled that the South African authorities had merel. sought to deport the 
applicant from South :\frica to New Zealand for repatriation . His transfer via 
London was not deemed to be an elaborate ploy conjured up by the English 
and South African authorities to justify the applicant' arrival in the United 
Kingdom. As uch. the High Court of Justiciary concluded that the Lord 
Advocate wa correct in deciding that there were n ground for re training 
the warrant and the proces was in no way tainted or improper. 
Ro e L.J . and Potts J . appear to have properly con trued (he rrue intention 
of (he 1706 Act. the framework of which embodied the idea of two separate 
legal sy terns operating on a detached but equal footing. The Act. and its 
subsequent interpretation in the pre ent a -e. allow for the proper execution of 
the Scottish legal proce without any interference or interruption from an 
English court. Thi i al 0 c n~i tent \J ith the tatutory provision relating to 
the execution of a S tti h \ arrant outh of the border which recognise both 
the independence of S tti -h and Engli h criminal procedure and the need for 
a sy tern which all \l,. - f r the efficient execution of eros -border arrest 
warrant . It lour ntenti n that it i correct as a matter of principle that 
neither the S otti h r neli h police hould be restrained froin executing a 
cotti h warrant in England by an Engli h court. . 
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Keeping the Price and the Property: Sharp v. Thomson 
The Inner House of the Court of Session refused the appeal in Sharp v. 
Thomson on May 4, 1995 (1995 S.L.T. 837). While many mhy respect the 
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legal reasoning behind at least a part of the decision, there is a general feeling 
that the result is itself unfair. This view was echoed by the Lord President in 
hi judgment when he indicated clearly that the result was' 'unsatisfactory" . 
The case is now to be appealed to the House of Lords. 
The fact of the case will now be welJ known. A building company granted a 
floating charge in favour of the Bank of Scotland covering its whole property 
from time to time. By missives concluded in May 1989 the company sold a 
basement flat to the defenders. The price was paid and entry was taken on June 
12, 1989. On August 9. 1990 a disposition in favour of the defenders was 
executed and delivered along with a deed of restriction by the Bank of Scot-
land relative to a standard security which they held. A certificate of non-
crystallisation relative to the floating charge had been signed by the Bank on 
June 8. 1989. A similar certificate could have been provided to the purchasers 
if it had been req~·ested in 1990. No such certificate was delivered to the 
purchasers and on August 10. 1990 the pursuers were appointed joint recei ver 
of the company by the Bank of Scotland. The disposition was recorded in the 
Register of Sa ines on Augu t 21. 1990. Put shortly. the que tion was whether 
the crystallisation of the tloating charge gave the recei vers a priority over the 
purchasers. Lord Penro e in the Outer House held (hat the receiver look 
priority because on crystallisation lhe tloating charge was deemed to be a fixed 
-ecurity over the property in term of ection 53 (7) of the Insolvency Act 
1986. The Inner House upheld thIS decision with no dis ent. 
There are really two a pect to the deci ion. There is the question of what 
right a purcha er obtains ( heritable property on deli very of the dispo ition 
and the question of what property falls within the property and undertaking of 
n company for the purpose s of a tloaring charge. There ha " ahvay - been n 
academic debate over the fir t of these issues. It is generally accepted that a 
purchaser under missi\"es but with n delivered or recorded disposition has a 
j lls crediri against the "eller and nothing more (Gihsof/ , .. Hunter Home 
Designs Lu.i.. 1976 S.C. 23: 1976 S.L.T. 9.+ L When a di po aion is deli\"ered. 
however. the seller puts it outwith his own power to stOP the purcha er 
recording or registering a title and, although it has been accepted (hat the JllS 
in re only arises on recording or regi tration. there has been a viev. thal 
delivery results in a proprietOrial right. This proprietorial right was cia sified 
as a jus ad rem . Counsel for the appellants argued that delivery of the 
disposition to the purchasers' olicitors gave the purchasers a proprietorial 
right and accordingly the tloating charge did not attach. Counsel relied 
heavily on the dictum of Lord President Emslie in Gibson \'. Hunter Home 
Designs 0976 S.C. at 27: 1976 S.L.T. at 96). In that case the Lord President 
stated: . 'On delivery of the disposition the purchaser becomes vested in a 
personal right to the subjects in question and his acquisition of a real right to 
the subjects is dependent upon recording the dispo ition in the appropriate 
Register of Sasines .... Until the moment of delivery the purchaser, even if he 
has paid the price and obtained occupation of the subjects, has no more than 
